Abstract The goal of the paper is to try to account for an interesting binding phenomenon, namely the fact that pronouns sometimes appear to be bound by universal quantifiers out of islands. Specifically, my claim is that the appearance of binding is an illusion which results from the fact that pronouns can stand for universal quantifiers, i.e. there is a new type of pronouns of laziness. However, the distribution of such pronouns of laziness is highly restricted. These restrictions can be derived by means of Maximize Presupposition principle and situation semantics.
The fact that binding is possible in this configuration is quite puzzling. It has often been argued in the literature that the necessary condition on binding is a c-command requirement (cf. Reinhart 1983) which was hotly debated for decades but recently defended against apparent counterexamples by Büring's (2004) situation semantic approach. In (1), the quantifier, obviously, doesn't c-command the pronoun. But even if we assume that the surface c-command requirement is not the one that determines the possibility of binding, it is still not clear how the quantifier can bind the pronoun, as the pronoun is not in the scope of the quantifier (if we believe that QR is clause-bound). So sentences like (1) seem to be a problem for any existing semantic theory of variable binding.
Moreover, the situation seems to be even more complicated than that, as binding out of an embedded clause is not an option that is always available, as (2) shows: The main claim I argue for in this paper is that in cases like (1), a pronoun is not truly a bound variable, rather it stands for a universally quantified NP, thus creating the illusion of binding.
What is the source of binding?
The goal of this section is to find out what the source of binding in cases like (1) is. In subsection 2.1, I will test whether QR can be responsible for these exceptional binding cases. In subsection 2.2, the situation binding approach à la Fox & Sauerland (1997) will be examined. In subsection 2.3, I will sketch an alternative analysis.
Quantifier raising?
The first obvious possible answer to the question of what the source of binding in cases like (1) is could be Quantifier Raising (I am not concerned whether it is literally QR or some other mechanism which is responsible for a quantifier getting wide scope). Let's test this hypothesis.
First of all, it should be noted that QR is commonly assumed to be clause-bound, which should prevent the quantifier every from taking scope over the matrix sentence. But let's assume for a second that the quantifier can undergo QR out of the if-clause, which results in the following LF:
∀x. if x minds x's own business, x will be more useful
If it was indeed a legitimate movement, we wouldn't have any problems at all, since, as it seems, the LF in (3) correctly captures the truth conditions of (1). However, this line of analysis cannot be maintained even if we were willing to relax our assumptions about the locality of QR because of the puzzle described below. Let's consider the following situation: Let's suppose that (5) has the LF in (6): (6) ∀x. if x marries one of the sisters, x's brother will become x's brother-in-law. Now consider the situation in which Sam marries Mary, but Jeremy doesn't marry Claire. Then, if (6) was indeed an allowed representation of (5), the sentence would be predicted to entail that Sam's brother (Jeremy) becomes his brother-in-law. The prediction, however, is not borne out. In fact, we do not interpret (5) as entailing that Jeremy becomes Sam's brother-in-law in this scenario, as for two brothers to become brothers-in-law they both must marry two sisters (it is not enough for one of them to marry one of the sisters). Thus, analyzing this case leads us to the conclusion that the binding interpretation cannot be the result of a quantifier taking wide scope outside of an if -clause.
Trivialization of a universal quantifier by a generic operator?
The other option would be to say that binding in (1) is merely an illusion, the crucial mechanism for getting the interpretation being situation binding as proposed in Fox & Sauerland 1997 for universal quantifiers in generic contexts in English.
Fox and Sauerland note that in generic contexts QR of universal quantifiers may seem to violate clause-boundedness or obviate WCO effect, cf. example in (7). (7) Her i thesis year is the hardest for [every student] i .
The grammaticality of (7) shows that the effect of WCO is somehow obviated 2 . Fox and Sauerland argue that this unexpectedly large scope of the universal quantifier is due to the presence of the generic operator and not to QR. The pronoun in this case is interpreted as an e-type pronoun, namely a definite description dependent on the situation that the generic operator quantifies over. The interpretation they propose for (7) is as in (8) However, we are facing the same problem again: the predicted truth conditions are too strong. In the situation where Sam marries Mary and Jeremy doesn't marry Claire, it would be predicted that Jeremy and Sam become brothers-in-law, but this prediction is not borne out, as was already discussed in the previous subsection.
A sketch of the proposal: pronouns as hidden universals
In the two preceding subsections, I presented some evidence for the fact that the binding interpretation in sentences like (1) is due neither to QR nor to the generic operator. The proposal I will argue for is that it is due to the fact that a pronoun stands for a universal quantifier.
Note that if we assume that a pronoun stands for a universal quantifier, we can capture the truth conditions of (5) correctly. Consider the possible LF of (5): (10) If [each of the two brothers] marries one of the sisters, [each of the two brothers] λ x. x's brother becomes x's brother-in-law.
If so, the binding interpretation in cases like (5) is not the result of real binding, but it is just a binding illusion.
The question I will be concerned with in the next section is what are conditions under which this binding illusion is possible. In particular, in case of conditionals, the question is what the semantics of a conditional must be.
The claim I will argue for is that only a particular type of conditionals, namely one-case conditionals in the sense of Kadmon 1987 , allow for such a binding illusion. I will attempt to derive this restriction from the principle of Maximize Presupposition.
3 What is the semantics of an "exceptional binding" conditional?
It is generally assumed that if -clauses serve as restrictors of different operators, cf. Kratzer 1987 and others. They can restrict a covert adverb of quantification as in (11) or a covert modal as in (12). Kadmon (1987) terms the readings exemplified in (11) and (12) multi-case and one-case interpretation, respectively: (11) (ALWAYS) If John stays late at work, he has no dinner.
(12) (MUST) If John's light is on now, he is at home.
The sentences in (11) and (12) can be given the following paraphrases, respectively:
(13) 'Whenever John stays late at work, he has no dinner.' (14) 'If it's true that John's light is on now, then he is at home.'
The rough semantics we adopt for multi-case and one-case conditionals is given in (15) and (16): (15) Every situation in which John stays late at work is a situation in which he has no dinner.
(16) In all the worlds compatible with our knowledge in which John's light is on, he is at home.
The difference between the two types of conditionals is that there is quantification over situations within the same world in the case of (11), whereas there is quantification over possible worlds associated with the modal but no quantification over situations within one world in the case of (12).
In what follows, I will give some evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the "exceptional binding" conditional must have "one-case" semantics and try to give an explanation for that fact.
Aspect and one-case vs. multi-case interpretation
It has often been claimed that perfective sentences express an episodic event, whereas imperfective sentences can report a generalization (see Bonomi 1997 and MenendezBenito 1983, i.a, for Italian and Spanish) . This seems to be true for Russian as well. As shown below, unlike imperfective sentences, perfective sentences are incompatible with always-type adverbs which can serve as evidence for the fact that perfective sentences cannot have a multi-case interpretation. The imperfective conditional (19) can be paraphrased as follows: whenever John comes home early, he will cook dinner. The perfective conditional (20), on the other hand, is incompatible with the quantificational adverbial 'every time', as the ungrammaticality of (20) shows. Taking into consideration the facts discussed above, we can conclude that perfective aspect blocks generic (multi-case) interpretation.
An obvious way of deriving this generalization is to assume that perfective if -clauses cannot serve as restrictors to adverbs of quantification 3 .
To implement this idea technically, we can adopt the analysis of the perfective/imperfective aspect along the lines of Hacquard 2006. The perfective aspect is associated with existential quantification over events and its semantics looks as follows:
The imperfective morpheme, in its turn, doesn't have any semantic import by itself. It is just a default morpheme which appears in the environments in which perfective cannot. Thus, the difference between perfective and imperfective if -clauses can be described as follows. Perfective aspectual operator closes existentially the situation variable, thus making the if -clause not able to restrict the adverb. The imperfective morpheme, on the contrary, doesn't do anything by itself, so the imperfective ifclause can perfectly restrict the generic operator.
Crucially, the sentence (5) is perfective, which nicely demonstrates that sentences that allow exceptional binding do not need to be multi-case conditionals.
In the next subsection, I will try to show that sentences that allow exceptional binding not only do not need but in fact cannot be multi-case conditionals.
Multi-case conditionals and binding
It seems that binding illusion is ruled out in all the cases of multi-case conditionals. Consider a multi-case conditional (22) The question arises as to what exactly blocks binding in case of multi-case conditionals.
Exceptional binding and Maximize Presupposition
As was shown in the previous subsection, binding is impossible in multi-case conditionals. In this subsection, I will try to give a possible solution to the question of why this is so.
Note that if the universally quantified NP is replaced with an indefinite NP in (22), the sentence becomes good (we get a typical donkey sentence). What explains the contrast between (22) and (24)? We can assume that in generic (multi-case) sentences, there is a competition between a universally quantified NP and an indefinite NP for expressing binding interpretation. It was argued that in donkey sentences, quantification is over minimal situations. Thus, we can assume that an indefinite NP is preferred over every-NP due to the Maximize Presupposition principle, which requires that the expression with the strongest presupposition be used, cf. Heim 1997. The article a in English and corresponding bare NP in Russian have the uniqueness presupposition in generic sentences, cf. Percus 1997, unlike every which doesn't have such a presupposition, so by this principle an indefinite NP must be used.
As for non-generic sentences, there is no such competition between an indefinite NP and a universally quantified NP, since in this case there is nothing that can give a universal force to an indefinite NP (in case of generic conditionals, it was an adverb quantification ( = generic operator) which was the source of the quantificational force). Based on the evidence given above, we can conclude that sentences such as (1) cannot be generic sentences quantifying over minimal situations, and exceptional binding is possible only in one-case conditionals. Taking into account this generalization, let's modify our LF for (5) In the next section, I will show that this LF must be modified a little bit more.
5 From now on I will omit this part of the LF, since it is not relevant for the present discussion.
One more constraint on exceptional binding
In the previous section, I showed that exceptional binding is ruled out in multi-case conditionals. However, having one-case conditional semantics is not enough for binding to be possible. Consider the contrast between the (a) and (b) sentences in (26)- (29) As can be seen from the examples above, all the (a)-sentences are good, whereas (b)-sentences are ungrammatical. It should be noted that the only difference between the (a) and (b) sentences is the consequent clause (the antecedent clause is the same). The question that arises is what is this relation between the antecedent and the consequent that affects the possibility of binding and what it tells us about.
It turned out to be a difficult task to define what exactly the semantic difference between the (a) and (b) sentences is. An interesting observation, however, is that the sentences that allow binding also allow for modification with the adverbial tem samym, literally: 'by that itself' (a rough English equivalent would be a paraphrase with a by-gerund) of the form shown in (30): (30) Esli každyj i zajmetsja svoim delom, on i tem samym prineset bol'she pol'zy. 'By starting doing his own business, one will become more useful.' (Literally:'If everyone i starts doing his own business, by that itself he i will bring more use.
')
Intuitively, what the possibility of modification with tem samym is telling us is that the situations expressed by the antecedent and the consequent clauses are in fact the same situation, only with different names. When the situations are different and the conditional sentence in fact expresses the relation that holds between them (for example, it could be a causal relation), such modification becomes impossible, cf. The question now is how to implement this intuition technically. To try to do it, let's return to Russian and look again at the LF in (25), repeated in (33): (33) if ∃s 1 .each of the brothers marries one of the sisters in s 1 , ∃s 2 . [each of the brothers] λ x. x's brother would become x's brother-in-law in s 2 .
How can we guarantee that s 1 and s 2 be the same situation? It's not such a trivial task, as the situation variable of the consequent clause cannot be bound by the existential quantifier which is inside the if -clause. At the moment, I am not ready to provide any good solution to this problem. The only thing I would like to point here is that it is possible to imagine how it can be done within a dynamic binding approach, as pointed out to me by I. Heim (p.c.) 6 .
Roughly speaking, within this approach, the semantics of a conditional "if p, then q" is equivalent to "if p, then p and q" and thus the variable contained in the consequent clause q can be bound by a quantifier from the antecedent clause p. Then to represent the idea that the antecedent and the consequent are part of one and the same situation, the LF given in (33) should be modified in the following way: Under such scenario, the sentence (35) entails that Peter and John are being more useful. However, the analysis developed so far doesn't predict this. The LF for (35) is given in (37):
(37) if ∃s 1 .everyone is doing his job in s 1 , ∃s 2 .everyone is doing his job in s 2 and everyone will be more useful in s 2 .
According to the LF in (37), the entailment that John and Peter are being more useful is predicted to be falsified by the scenario sketched above, but in fact, as we just said, it is not.
Accounting for both readings 7
It is commonly assumed that quantifier domains are contextually restricted. For example, when we say "Every student is writing a composition", it is evident that we refer not to every student in the world, but to some restricted domain, for example, we can mean every student in the class. Sometimes this domain restriction is overtly expressed as in (38):
(38) Everyone in this room is sleeping.
In the literature, there were attempts to use Austinian topic situations (situations the assertions are about) to account for the implicit quantifier restrictions, cf. Kratzer 2009 and references therein. But it has been convincingly argued by Soames (1985) that quantifier domains are not necessarily provided by topic situations. To demonstrate that, Soames gave the following example: (39) Everyone is asleep and is being monitored by a research assistant (in a Sleep Lab).
If the domain of everyone were provided by a single topic situation, this utterance would have been contradictory, since then it would be understood that the research assistants are also asleep. This paradox is resolved by stating that the implicit quantifier restriction comes not from the topic situation, but from another, contextually salient "resource situation" (in case of (39), this situation doesn't include research assistants).
I will adopt the idea that a quantifier contains a situation variable which can get its value from the context. In such a way, the weaker reading of the sentences like (1)/(35) can be accounted for. The weaker reading of (1) Under this scenario, the sentence entails that Peter and John are being useful. Do we predict this with the LF in (41)? In this case, the situation in which Peter and John are doing their business can be picked as a situation s 1 . Thus the LF in (41) says that everyone in that situation, namely Peter and John, are being more useful, which is correct. I assume that sentences like (1) are ambiguous. They can have both LFs which accounts for the two readings. But sometimes the context can make the sentence false under one of the readings, thus forcing the other reading, as was the case with the sentence (5). The same holds for the following sentence. Esli by každyj biznesmen i vložil den'gi v stroitel'stvo školy, on i by ne obednel, a milliony šhkol byli by postroeny. Literally: 'If every businessman i gave some money for school construction, he i wouldn't become poorer but millions of schools would be constructed.'
The context dictates that only the weaker reading is available, as we know that for millions of schools to be constructed it is necessary that a lot of businessmen invest money into it.
The relevant configuration of a quantifier and a pronoun
One more question that needs to be answered is why the sentence (44) cannot have the meaning shown in (45).
(44) Every boy likes his father.
(45) Every boy likes every boy's father.
Descriptively, it looks like the necessary requirement for a pronoun to be able to stand for a universal quantifier is the following: in order to be interpreted as a universal quantifier, a pronoun must be outside of the quantifier scope. I will leave the explanation of why this is so for further research.
Conclusion
To conclude, let me briefly repeat several main points I've made in the paper:
i. Pronouns sometimes seem to be bound by universal quantifiers outside of islands, which is a problematic fact for existing theories of variable binding.
ii. However, this is not a real binding, but a binding illusion which is created by the fact that pronouns can stand for universal quantifiers. Thus there exists a new type of pronouns of laziness.
iii. There are specific constraints on the environments in which pronouns can stand for universal quantifiers. Some of these constraints can be accounted for with the help of the Maximize Presupposition principle and situation semantics. Others are not yet very well understood and require some further investigation.
